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The purpose of this research is to analyze the association between corporate governance and firm 
performance. Specifically, it examines the impact of CEO duality on board characteristics and its 
relationship with firm performance through dynamic penal estimation. Findings of this research 
are based on a sample of 230 listed non-financial firms over the period 2004-2014. We document 
that the corporate governance plays a pivotal role in determining the financial performance of firms 
operating in Pakistan. Consistent with past studies, findings of this research also show some 
statistical variations among the sampled firms (large and small size). The CEO duality 
compromises the efficiency of board independence. Further, the non-linear relationship of 
managerial ownership with performance is also depicted through the results of this study. 







As per shareholders’ approach, corporate governance mechanism is set of rules and regulations 
aimed at protecting shareholders’ interests. The strict observance of corporate governance enables 
the firm to reduce principal-agent problem (Rudkin, Kimani, Ullah, Ahmed, & Farooq, 
2019;Akbar, Poletti-Hughes, Faitouri, & Shah, 2016). Managerial signaling theory implies that 
firms who comply with code of corporate governance convey an optimistic sign in the market in 
order to encourage the participants regarding the better governance structure of the firm.This 
results in high demand for the stocks of the firm in the market and hence leads to higher stock 
prices that translate into increased shareholders’ wealth1. In view of the implications of agency 
theory, compliance with code of corporate governance creates efficient monitoring and improves 
managerial activities that in turn reduce the chances of principal-agent conflict of interests (Jensen, 
1986). Thus, such compliance with code of corporate governance results in reducing agency costs 
and improves firm performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
Though there are many theoretical justifications, which support the notion that strong governance 
mechanism has improved the firm performance, however empirical evidence stated in the literature 
is mixed. For example Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003),Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
Brown and Caylor (2009), Bozec, Dia, and Bozec (2010), O’Connor and Rafferty (2012), Yasser, 
Entebang, and Mansor (2015) identified a postive assosiation between corporae governance and 
firm performance. However, researchers such as Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), S. Akbar, 
Poletti-Hughes, El-Faitouri, and Shah (2016) observed an insignificant association existing 
between strong governance practices and financial performance of firms.   
Such mixed empirical evidences supporting positive association between variables of corporate 
governance practice and firm’s performance may be due to differences in choice of models, 
empirical testing and econometric procedures (Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010). Earlier, in their 
study, Ullah, Akhtar, and Zaefarian (2018) 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found endogeneity to exist between these two variables i.e. if corporate 
governance compliance is well defined then it might lead to the improved firm performance, which 
ultimately results good governance practices. The two-way causality gives rise to problem of 
endogeneity. Inadequate empirical models and methodologies such as the use of OLS and panel 
regressions may give spurious results. Moreover, they also discussed that once endogeneity is 
appropriately accounted for in the model, then it may lead to the insignificant affiliation between 
firm performance and corporate gonvernance (Shultz et al. 2010).  
The current research thereby addressing the intriguing question of whether compliance with code 
of corporate governance reduce the agency conflict and improve the firm performance in dynamic 
penal framework. For instance, with reference to Pakistan, some of the past studies, such as Yasser, 
Entebang, and Mansor (2015), Khan and Awan (2012), A. Akbar (2014), Javaid and Saboor (2015) 
and Awan and Jamali (2016) have not provided any realistic justification for the problem of 
endogeneity. This study is the first to our knowledge that considers the endogeneity issue existing 
between corporate governance and firm performance1. Current study has incorporated estimation 
technique proposed by Arellano-Bond (AB) generalized method of moments (GMM)(Arellano & 
Bond, 1991), for analyzing the extended data comprising of large number of listed non-financial 
 
1  In Pakistan, SECP introduced the code of corporate governance in 2002 and later revised it in 2012. 
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firms in Pakistan. GMM has the advantage of producing parameter estimates that are unbiased and 
consistent; overcoming the endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and simultaneity problems (Shultz et 
al. 2010).  
Secondly, the previous literature considered return on equity (ROE) as effective measure vis-à-vis 
rate of return based on risk adjusted weighted average cost of capital. However, some researchers 
argued that market-based measure is more relevant given it reveals shareholders’ expectation 
regarding firm’s performance (Ganguli & Agrawal, 2009; Shan & McIver, 2011). A commonly 
used measure for market-based performance is Tobin's Q, which is determined by calculating the 
ratio of market value of firm’s assets to its book value. Firms with higher Tobin's Q values are 
considered better than those with lower scores (Lewellen & Badrinath, 1997). Hence, we consider 
proxies for measures of accounting as well as market-based firm performance. Thirdly, in another 
study, Gul and Leung (2004) argued that having unlimited power with one director (CEO duality) 
would ultimately paralyze the board effectiveness. Hence, we include the variable of CEO duality 
to play a moderating role between firm performance and independence of board, in our empirical 
analysis. Finally, most of the previous research studies have documented a linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance of Pakistani firms; however it may be non-
linear(Hu & Izumida, 2008). Therefore, we examine non-linearity of this relationship. Finally, 
Ullah and Kamal (2017) argued that legislators should consider the firm’s size while formulating 
corporate governance framework. Thus, we explore the association between strong governance 
practices and financial performance separately on sub-samples of different big and small firms 
included in our sample.  
We have organized the remainder of the paper into Section 2 that provides an articulation of 
hypotheses based on literature review; Section3 which describes empirical techniques; Section 4 
that clarifies the results and their discourses and Section 5 that provides conclusions. 
2. Literature Review  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), explained the agency relationship in terms of conflicting interests 
among principal(s) (shareholders) and agent(s) (management) and is used as an economic 
framework to analyse their relationship in organisational settings. Conflict of interest, as per 
agency theory, arises when utility maximising behaviour is exhibited by principal and agent both. 
To overcome this conflict of interest, the opportunistic behavior of the agent (manager) must be 
restricted (Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2011;Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The opportunistic-utility 
maximising behaviour of managers is reflected in ‘empire building’, mergers & acquisitions and 
higher selling and admin (S&A) expense all of which results in higher personal utility for managers 
(Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis, 2012). Executive stock option schemes, increased block-holding and 
institutional ownership, debt covenants and high involvement of non-executive directors etc. are 
among some ways through which conflict of interest can get reduced (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
The board composition is deemed as an important yardstick to curtail the managers’ opportunistic 
behavior through proper mechanism of corporate governance (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007). 
Moreover, administratively corporate board also empowers board members to devise a reward-
punishment strategy for the management (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999).  Alternatively, for 
reducing the principal-agency conflict, debt covenants might be used (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996).Nevertheless, the stewardship theory considered the managers as protectors of shareholders’ 
interest. The stewards strive hard for shareholders’ wealth maximization instead of being self-
centered. It presumes that stewards are motivated due to non-financial benefits such a need for 
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appreciation, internal satisfaction and recognition (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Hence, considerable 
representation of the executive’s directors in board ensures better decision making, because 
mangers have more indepth knowledge and information on current operating issues with the 
required technical know-how (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
2.1 Board Composition and Firm Performance 
2.1.1  Board Size and Firm Performance 
Since, setting a firm’s strategic direction is the responsibility of board which provides oversight 
on management of the firm as well, therefore board size is considered an important variable to 
determine a firm’s performance over time. There are mixed empirical evidences with regards to 
the role of board size in determining performance of a firm. For example, studies such as Belkhir 
(2009) and Jackling and Johl (2009) show some consistency with agency theory by analyzing that 
the firm performance improves in the presence of larger board, whereas studies like Zabri, Ahmad, 
and Wah (2016), Rashid, De Zoysa, Lodh, and Rudkin (2010), along with many others2 reported 
a negative relationship. These findings are consistent with Jensen (1993), according to whom large 
boards lack effectiveness and expertise are prone to the free-rider problem that considerably 
reduced their influence to devise and carrot and stick policies accordingly. Moreover, he suggested 
that board members might not exceed eight members. 
 
Endogeneity issue affects Board size and its relation with firm performance (Guest, 2009; Wintoki, 
Linck, & Netter, 2012), thus we can say that the reported empirical relationships (positive or 
negative) may not be valid. The endogeneity problem may be simultaneous or dynamic in nature 
(Guest 2009). When both board size as well as the variable of firm performance is jointly 
determined, it may give rise to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity caused by an unobserved 
third variable. Panel regression methods such as the fixed effect model may overcome this 
limitation (Guest 2009). To overcome simultaneous or dynamic endogeneity, researchers have 
used instrumental variable regressions (Adams & Mehran, 2005; Bennedsen, Kongsted, & Nielsen, 
2008). However, the main limitation of the instrumental variable regression is the identification of 
relevant instrumental variables. Alternatively, the dynamic GMM estimation technique overcomes 
these problems as one solution for all. Further, it is argued that firm performance has no association 
with board size even after accounting for the effect of endogeneity by using dynamic GMM 
estimation technique (Wintoki et al. 2012). Hence, the following hypotheses is tested in current 
study:  
 
H1: Board size does not improve firm performance.  
 
2.1.2 The CEO Duality and Firm Performance 
 
CEO duality is “when the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board of directors of the 
firm”. According to agency theory, two separate and independent individuals should hold the 
position of CEO and board Chairman to guarantee higher impartiality leading to better supervision 
and control of board members (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen 1993). In contrast to this, stewardship 
theory offers support to CEO duality and posits its linkage with higher firm performance as a result 
of more focused and flexible leadership (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
 
2 See Guest (2009) for a more detail review and account of the studies that report a negative relationship between 
board size and corporate governance.  
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On the contrary, Pragmatic evidence on the aforementioned association is mixed. According to the 
observation of Yang and Zhao (2014), it was found that CEO duality and firm performance have 
a positive connection when a firm’s competitive environment is changed. They argued that savings 
in information costs and speedy decision making explained the observed relationship (Brickley, 
Coles, & Jarrell, 1997). Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli (2016), using dynamic GMM estimation, 
provide empirical evidence which suggested negative connection between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Moreover, it also observed that CEO duality affects quality of strategic decision 
making firstly due conflict of interests and secondly making extreme decisions and choices 
(Abdallah & Ismail, 2017; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Keeping in view these mixed evidences, 
we empirically test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: CEO duality has no dynamic relationship with firm performance.  
 
2.1.3 The Board independence and Firm Performance 
  
The aspect of board independence is a “measure of board composition and is measured as the 
percentage of independent directors to total directors on the board of directors”. Despite the 
popularity of board independence with investors, policy makers, regulators and others, it’s  
association with financial performance has no robust practical indications (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010; Yoshikawa, Zhu, & Wang, 2014). However, the extant literature suggests that 
the aforementioned relationship is weak in countries where investors face poor protection and 
where insider dealings also appears to exist. (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015). This is quite 
true of the equity market in Pakistan with relatively poor protection for investors and insiders’ self-
dealings.  
 
Weisbach (1988), Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), Mura (2007) and Liu et al. (2015) examined 
that board independence has a positive connection with firm performance. This can be explained 
in a way that presence of independent directors indicates independence of board that ultimately 
leads to better regulation and accomplishment of tasks, resolution of internal conflict of interest 
and reduction in communication barrier between inside directors and shareholders (Marashdeh, 
2014). This is consistent with agency theory. On the other hand, similar to the stewardship theory, 
Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Arosa, Iturralde, 
and Maseda (2013), in separate studies, examined that there exists a negative relationship of board 
independence with firm performance, whereas other studies like those of Kajola (2008) and Peng 
(2004) found insignifcant relatiosnhip between the ratio of outside directors to the entire board and 
its impact on firm performance. Given evidences in existing literature and in view of the existence 
of endogeneity between board independence and firm performance, we state the following 
hypotheses:  
 
H3: Board independence has no dynamic relationship with firm performance.  
 
2.1.4  The Board Meetings and Firm Performance 
  
To indicate the activeness and involvement of board, annual count of board meetings is 
deliberately used as a key indicator showing that board meetings are essential for the required 
oversight, control and monitoring of the firm (Byrne, 1996). More active board’s i.e. higher 
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number of board meetings indicate that members of such boards will act in shareholders’ interests 
(Bathula, 2008). Conger, Finegold, and Lawler (1998) observed that more time spent in board 
meeting allows the concern members to effeciently formulate compitative stretagies and better 
decision making. The previous litrature revealed mixed results regarding the board meeting and 
performance relationship. For instance, Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2012) came up with positive 
results regarding the impact of number of board meetings on firm performance. However, Jackling 
and Johl (2009) reported insignificant board meeting and performnce relationship. Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) found performance to be inversely impacted by increasing frequency of board 
meetings, because high frequency reduce the chances of consistency in attedance of directors.   
 
H4: Number of board meetings have no dynamic relationship with firm performance. 
 
2.2 The Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
2.2.1 The Concentrated ownership and Firm Performance 
 
The previous literature ascertained the decisive role of ownership structure in reducing agency 
problems and restructuring performance of firm. The scattered ownership might arise to agency 
risk, because the management is more susceptible to the takeover by outside shareholders (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). According to empirical studies such as Smith (1996), Claessens, Fan, 
Djankov, and Lang (1999), Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), Hussainey and Al‐Najjar (2012), and 
Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013) ownership concentration is found to be positively related with firm 
performance.  In accordance to agency theory, the monitoring mechanisms and firm performance 
is improved by concentrated ownership (Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015).On the other hand, a 
negative relationship is also reported by some studies (Hu et al., 2010). With regards to stewardship 
theory, consistency is found in a sense that indeed proper control and monitoring steward behavior 
would be counterproductive because the steward (management) already seeks to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth(Argyris, 1973). Conversely, Huang, Hsiao, and Lai (2007) in their study 
examined that no significant relationship appears to exist between concentrated structure of 
ownership and firm performance.  Following hypothesis is thus articulated: 
 
H5: Ownership concentration has no dynamic relationship with firm performance. 
 
2.2.2 The Managerial ownership and Firm Performance  
 
With regards to the relation between managerial ownership and performance, literature has 
reported two contradictory postures. On school of thought, believe managerial ownership deflate 
the performance, because majority of manager-cum-shareholders are involved in horal hazard 
behavior (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). It may lead to problems such as information asymmetry 
and agency problem. Contrary to this, managerial ownership is expected to have positively 
influence over the performance due to incentive alignment effect.  Sarkar & Sarkar (2000) find the 
positive impact of managerial ownership over the performance. Demsetz (1983) ascertained the 
positive managerial ownership and performance relationship. Nevertheless, Randøy, Down, and 
Jenssen (2003) find on insignficant association of owernship with performance.  
 




2.2.3 The Institutional ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Because institutional investors have greater capaity as well as incentives to curtail mangers’ 
opportunistic behaviour, institutional investors positively contribute towards the firm performance 
(Ullah, Ali, & Mehmood, 2017). The presence of instutional investors have two benfits. One, 
minority shareholders feel protected in presence of institutional investors.second, their presence 
also generate positive signal to the rational market participants (Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 
2008). However, such a higher level of involment in operation and tight montoring mechanism 
may potentially be counter productive, because it emasculates the stewards’ pro-organizational 
productive behavior(Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).Hence, despite the established 
positive relationship, institutional ownership may potentially give rise to conflicts (La Porta et al., 
2000). According to literature review; we have empirically tested the following hypothesis: 
H7: Institutional ownership has no dynamic relationship with firm performance. 
 
2.3 The Audit Committee Independence, Audit Quality and Firm Performance: 
The consistency as well as accountability of disclosed financial information greatly depends upon 
audit committee and its composition. The committee’s opinion enhance credibility of financial 
statements and increase reliability among investors (Borlea, Achim, & Mare, 2017). Hence, in 
order to improve the proficiency and effective working of audit committee and to reduce economic 
risk, it is important that sufficient numbers of independent directors serve the committee (Borlea, 
Achim, & Mare, 2017). It was also observed by Lin & Chang (2012) that independent directors 
works well with audit committee and results in improving the financial performance of a firm and 
also reduces agency risks. Similarly, Cadbury (1992) and Hsu & Wu (2014) also suggested another 
suitable measure to protect shareholders’ interest, i.e. compulsion of audit committee which gives 
protection by improving transparency and accountability. However, stewardship theory considered 
the tight monitoring mechanism would ultimately demise the productivity and motivation of the 
management.  
Moreover, all the stakeholders widely accept the assessment of Big-4 audit firm’s review. 
According to some empirical studies, including Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004), Dasilas and 
Papasyriopoulos (2015) and Pittman and Fortin (2004), the audit services from Big-4 transparent 
audit firms is positively associated with firm’s financial performance. Furthermore, it has been 
observed that external auditors are considered to act as a fundamental part of observing framework. 
According to the argument presented by DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) the 
credibility of financial disclosure got improved because of independent auditors and it resulted in 
incredible firm performance and reduced the chances of default risk. Nevertheless, the steward 
ship thoery states that if shareholders and management choose a stewardship relationship. The 
principal-steward  relationship enhances the firm  perfomance because psychologically the steward 
gain statistificaiton from achieving organizational goals. However, the conflict arises when 
principal opt for agency relationship while steward relationship is chosen by manager. As a result 
the agents are unable to enjoy the intrinsic motivations such as progress,  success,  or  self 
actualization. Such a less trusting enviroment considerably reduces the feelings of  self-control, 
self-worth and self-responsibility(Argyris, 1973). Resultant,the employee becomes involve in 
counter produtive activities such as   such “theft  and  vandalism;  poor  workmanship;  slow-  
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downs;  stealing;  causing  waste” (Argyris, 1973). We state the following hypothesis to 
empirically test any relaionship of audit committee and audit quality with firm performance: 
H8: The composition of Audit Committee has no dynamic relationship with firm performance. 
H9: Audit Quality has no dynamic relationship with firm performance. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 The Detail of Sample 
Our population consist of 650 list firms. Out of total, 146 firms belong to financial sector. Since 
only non-financial firms are incorporated in current study’s sample therefore we have omitted the 
financial firms. Afterward, we have excluded 274 firms due to incomplete data. Moreover, we also 
excluded around 39 firms, which were having less than 05 years data. Finally, we have considered 
191 firms for the dynamic penal estimation. The sample covers 13 major sectors of Pakistan stock 
exchange including Fertilizer, Cement, Oil and Gas and Automobile Parts & Accessories among 
many others. 
3.2 The Operationalization of Variables (Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm 
Performance): 
Study variables have been classified into three categories for our empirical analysis: independent 
or explanatory variables (corporate governance: audit committee, board structure and ownership 
structure), dependent variable (Financial Performance), and control variables (firm size). These 




Table 02: The Measurement of Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm Performance 
Variable Symbol                                  Measurement  
Firm Performance 
Return on Equity ROE It is measured as (NI/Total Equity) 
TobinQ  TBQ It is calculate as(Market value of equity+ BV(debt)/BV(Total assets) 
Corporate Governance Mechanism   
Board Size BSIZE Total number of executive and non-executive board members 
Board Independence BIND The percentage of non-executive board members   
Board Meeting BMEET Dummy variable that equal to 1if Four meeting once in a year and 0 otherwise 
CEO Duality CD Dummy variable that equal to 1 if CEO is also board chairman and 0 otherwise  
Concentrated Ownership CONC The natural log of the total number of firm shareholders. 
Institutional Ownership INSTOWN It represents the institutional investors’ ownership at time t for firm i 




Calculated as the square of managerial ownership at time t for firm i 
Audit Quality AUDQ Dummy variable that equal to 1if audited by the Big Four  and 0 otherwise  
AuditComitteeComposition ACC It is calculated as a proportion of outside directors in audit committee  
Change in corporate 
governance Code 
CCCG Dummy variable=1when code of corporate governance has changed otherwise zero  
Control Variables  
SIZE SIZE Calculated as log of total assets at time t for firm i 
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3.2 Model specification 
The previous literature found the problem of endogeneity in corporate governance and firm 
performance relationship. Several plausible explanations are available for this in literature. For 
instance, Ullah et al. (2018),  and Abdallah et al.  (2017) argued that due to the omission of 
explanatory variables, endogeneity arises, which make these illustrative variables correlated with 
residuals of estimated model. Secondly, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) asserted that endogeneity 
might arise due to reverse causality between corporate governance and firm’s performance.  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients, in such cases are considered to be biased and 
inconsistent because of endogeneity and unobserved firm’s fixed effect (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
and Nguyen et al., 2015).  
One possible solution can be the use of fixed effect model for the time-invariant unobserved firm’s 
(fixed) effect which could possibly fix the firm’s fixed effect problem. However, the problem of 
endogeneity still exist (Nguyen et al., 2015).  Bhagat and Bolton (2008) suggested the use of 
simultaneous equations such as 2SLS and 3SLS.Cho (1998),  Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and 
Nguyen et al.  (2015), and others, recommend the use of Arellano-Bond (AB) generalized method 
of moments (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The AB GMM approach corrects for 
the endogeneity problem without relying on external exogenous instruments that are difficult to 
categorize in 2SLS and 3SLS (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012) 
Here, determining number of lags of endogenous variables in the estimated model is very 
important. The previous literature such as Adams et al. (2010), Munisi and Randøy (2013), Nguyen 
et al. (2014) suggest an AR (1) process.  According to the study of Nguyen et al. (2015) current 
financial performance of a firm is mostly likely dependent upon its previous performance. Hence 
it is possible that performance beyond one lag may have significant effect over the current financial 
performance. Therefore, the use of AR (1) may be least preferable. Zhou, Faff, and Alpert (2014), 
on the other hand, claim that in corporate finance panel datasets within the limitation of the time 
dimension, it seems that an AR (1) panel model is inevitable. 
Specifically we estimate the AB GMM model in equation (1) where firm performance is 
measured as ROE i.e. accounting based performance measure:  
𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑡 +
𝑌𝐷𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           (1) 
 
Where α 0 is the constant; α1 and βk are unknown estimated coefficients. We have also used YDt 
i.e. year wise dummies as control variable. The μi in equation (2) represents unobserved firm fixed-
effects; ηt represents time-specific effects that are common to all companies and time-variant, e.g. 
other macroeconomic conditions; and ε is the error term which is assumed to be identically 






4. Empirical Analysis: 
4.1 The Descriptive statistics and Correlation Matrix: 
Table 02 exhibits the descriptive statistics. Tobin’s Q has an average value of 1.395 thus revealing 
that, on average market value is greater than book value of selected non-financial firms during the 
sampling period. It further depict that investors have positive perception regarding the firms in 
exploiting their capitals (Lewellen & Badrinath, 1997). The return on equity has mean value of 
14.6% which reveals that on average the firms are profitable during the time horizon which could 
be another reason for higher TobinQ. 
Typically, board size, for the aggregate sample, has a mean of about 8.00. The current findings 
have relevance with previous empirical studies (Bokpin, Isshaq, & Aboagye-Otchere, 2011). 
Similarly, for the whole sample, on average among all board members, 17.1% are independent 
directors. These figures are lower as compared to the findings of Ullah and Kamal (2017) who 
reported 47.0% for their sample. The inconsistent results can be explained because of dissimilar 
sample size and time horizon. Consistent with Ullah and Kamal (2017), the board meeting has a 
mean value of 5.2. As for the frequency of meetings, the mean value for our sample is higher than 
SECP required criteria of minimum four meetings in a year. 
 
The concentrated ownership has a mean of 7.5%, which reveals dispersed ownership of the 
selected firms. The findings are contradictory to claim of Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) 
who noticed that about two-third of the firms in Asian market has concentrated ownership, Thus  
leading to the problematic situation for minority shareholders in terms of wealth expropriation. 
The firms have on average institutional ownership of 13.4%, which higher than mean value of 
concentrated ownership. It should be prominent that the variation in this proportion varies greatly 
from 0% to about 98.9%, suggesting in Pakistan the ownership structure of companies is largely 
dependent upon the institutional investors. Among the ownership proxies, the managerial 
ownership stood higher with an average value of 22.6. While this range varies from 0 to 95.7%, 
suggesting that majority of the companies are managerial ownership has vital role in shaping the 
firm performance.  
The correlation matrix is presented in table 03. It is observed that the market based and accounting 
measure are positively correlated with eachother, supporting that both measures can be used for 
the measurement of firm performance. Moreover, a significant positive correlation of board size 
also exists with TobinQ and ROE at 5% and 10% respectively. The positive coefficient suggests 
that companies having large boards have greater firm value. 
Noticeably, the correlation coefficient between Tobin and CD is -0.10 and statistically significant 
at 1% level. It suggests a negative correlation with CEO duality with firm performance. Two 
ownership proxies (institutional ownership and concentrated ownership) are found to have 
statistically significant positive correlation with board size, suggesting that firm with higher 
concentrated ownership and institutional ownership tend to have higher board size. The negative 
correlation of institutional ownership with board meeting is an indication that firms whose 
institutional ownership is higher tend to have lower board meetings. Other than this, the correlation 
coefficient of audit committee size and board size reveals that companies with large boards also 
have larger audit committees. Results show that the highest correlation coefficient is between 





Table 02: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
TBQ 1405.0 1.395 1.149 0.465 16.550 
ROE 1405.0 0.146 1.138 -32.646 10.635 
BSIZE 1405.0 8.042 1.748 0.000 20.000 
BIND 1405.0 0.171 0.243 0.000 1.000 
BMEET 1405.0 5.211 2.604 0.000 30.000 
CD 1405.0 0.178 0.383 0.000 1.000 
CONC 1405.0 7.578 1.213 2.708 11.956 
INST 1405.0 0.134 0.149 0.000 0.988 
MANG 1405.0 0.226 0.262 0.000 0.957 
MANGSQ 1405.0 0.120 0.194 0.000 0.916 
AUQ 1405.0 0.587 0.493 0.000 1.000 
ACC 1405.0 0.760 0.281 0.000 1.000 
CCCG 1405.0 0.270 0.444 0.000 1.000 





Table 03: Correlation Matrix                         
  TBQ ROE BSIZ BIND BMEET CD CONC INST MANG MANGSQ AUQ ACC CCCG 
 
FSZ 
TBQ 1.00             
 
ROE 0.12*** 1.00            
 
BSIZ 0.08** 0.06* 1.00           
 
BIND 0.02 0.02 0.05 1.00          
 
BMEET -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.01 1.00         
 
CD -0.04 -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.07** -0.01 1.00        
 
CONC 0.01 0.01 0.35*** 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 1.00       
 
INST -0.07* 0.01 0.18*** 0.08** -0.08** -0.04 0.12*** 1.00      
 
MANG -0.15*** -0.03 -0.24*** -0.13*** -0.02 0.15*** -0.40*** -0.21*** 1.00     
 
MANGSQ -0.12*** -0.02 -0.21*** -0.11*** -0.02 0.14*** -0.35*** -0.21*** 0.95*** 1.00    
 
AUQ 0.12*** 0.06* 0.21*** 0.02 -0.02 -0.14*** 0.26*** 0.08** -0.22*** -0.17*** 1.00   
 
ACC 0.02 0.00 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.09*** -0.07* 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 0.11*** 1.00  
 
CCCG 0.17*** 0.03 -0.05* -0.08** 0.02 -0.15*** 0.00 -0.09*** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 1.00  
FSZ -0.07* 0.04 0.33*** -0.00 0.13*** -0.06* 0.65*** 0.12*** -0.29*** -0.24*** 0.29*** 0.03 0.06* 
 
1.00 
Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, and * at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively 
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Table 04: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Full Sample) 
     
   
 ROE  TobinQ 
                
 Coeff Coeff Coeff  Coeff Coeff Coeff 
L.TBQ 
    
1.015*** 1.014*** 0.701*** 
 
    
0.0262 0.0264 0.0225 
L.ROE 0.00253* 0.00286** 0.00363***  
   
 0.00132 0.00133 0.00136  
   
BSIZ 0.0269* 0.0277* 0.0303**  -0.0424*** -0.0451*** -0.00843 
 0.0143 0.0147 0.0143  0.0102 0.0112 0.00922 
BIND 0.505*** 0.586*** 0.595***  -0.220*** -0.184*** -0.129** 
 0.0842 0.111 0.111  0.0678 0.0705 0.0577 
BMEET 0.0157* 0.0176** 0.0184**  0.00937 0.00929 -0.00891 
 0.0082 0.00831 0.00814  0.00927 0.00926 0.00725 
CD -0.487*** -0.446*** -0.452***  -0.0990*** -0.0664* -0.0796** 
 0.0865 0.092 0.0905  0.0363 0.0367 0.0344 
CDBIND  -0.252 -0.254   -0.189* 0.0922 
  0.197 0.201   0.112 0.0923 
CONC 0.0496 0.0396 0.0422  0.0770* 0.0851* 0.152*** 
 0.0486 0.0468 0.0484  0.0459 0.047 0.0512 
INST -0.194 -0.211* -0.202  -0.17 -0.154 -0.164 
 0.122 0.124 0.123  0.126 0.126 0.12 
MANGSQ  0.288* 0.908**   0.184 0.243 
   0.162 0.428   0.148 0.416 
MANG 0.143  -0.516*  0.146  0.00515 
  0.12  0.31  0.107  0.311 
AUQ -0.274*** -0.283*** -0.281***  -0.0197 -0.0204 0.0428 
 0.0974 0.098 0.097  0.0417 0.0428 0.0392 
ACC -0.125** -0.133*** -0.137***  0.0589 0.0543 0.112** 
 0.0491 0.0489 0.0487  0.0607 0.0601 0.0514 
CCCG   -0.317***    0.139* 
   0.109    0.0734 
FSZ 0.16 0.187* 0.183*  -0.0351 -0.0389 -0.133* 
 0.11 0.11 0.11  0.0573 0.0567 0.0721 
Constant 2.834* -3.198* -2.825*  0.392 0.424 1.415 
 1.704 1.716 1.615  0.987 0.983 1.118 
Wald Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, and * at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively 
 
 
Sargan Test 0.1909 0.1781 0.1745  0.1126 0.1165 0.0572 
AR2 Test( P value) 0.3097 0.3374 0.3188  0.1017 0.1044 0.4433 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 776 776 776  553 553 765 
Number of NUM 191 191 191   172 172 190 
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statistically significant ( P value =0.000). This situation triggers the problem of multi-collinearity, 
because it is above the threshold of 0.80 suggested by Gujarati (2009).  There are two possible 
solutions to resolve the issue of multi-collinearity. Firstly, the variable can be dropped from the 
estimation. Secondly, the variables with  higher correlation can be regressed in separate models. 
We opted for the second option to resolve the issue of multi-collinearity. 
4.2 Regression Analysis for Full Sample: 
The previous literature established that there exist the issue of reverse causality in the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance which leads to creation of the problem of 
endogeneity (Ullah et al., 2018)Brown, Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011). Hence, the use static models 
would yield inconsistent and biased regression estimators (Wintoki et al., 2012).Hence for making 
the estimator consistent, there two available options. Firstly, we can take lag of explanatory 
variables. Secondly, dynamic penal frame work can be executed through two widely-used 
techniques for correcting the problem of this inconsistency if T is fixed are: (i) AB difference 
GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and (ii) BB system GMM estimator 
recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998). We employ the former estimation technique to 
analyze corporate governance-firm performance relationship in which firm size and year-wise 
dummies are controlled. The p-values of Sargan test and AR (2) were insignificant in the full 
sample and subsamples, which shows the validity of the instrument used in the model, as well as 
also showing the absence of serial correlation problem in data. 
In line with previous findings, we that board size has a positive effect on firm performance which 
suggests that larger boards improve firms better. Consistent with the claim of resource dependency 
theory, boards which are larger in size have the competitive advantage of diverse knowledge, skills 
and easy access to capital sources in order to take better decisions, which reduces the agency 
problem (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Further, for robustness the market based measure 
i.e., TobinQ is used. Ironically, the positive sign has changed to negative coefficient values. 
Consistent with previous empirical studies, as Nguyen et al. (2014), Guest (2009) found negative 
association of board size with firm performance.  
In addition to this, board independence positively effects return on equity and negatively effects 
Tobin’s Q. The positive coefficient is consistent with the agency theory, which proclaimed that 
transparent monitoring and increase in expert knowledge is ensured by large number of 
independent board members (Baranchuk & Dybvig, 2008). While negative coefficient board 
independence is consistent with the notion that outside directors have too many directorships at 
the same time in different firms, which may negatively affect the monitoring role of busy 
independent directors and leads to decreasing the firm performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
Similarly, the some empirical studies observed negative effect due to the presence of outside 
director, because these directors are unfamiliar with firm operations. Thus, their decisions may 
damage firm performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). 
We find the positive effect of board meeting, consistent with notion, due to frequent board meeting 
efficiency of board got enrich which in return affect the internal control quality Further, board 
members have sufficient time to work in best interest of shareholders due to frequent 
meetings(Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, & Nagel, 2012). According to Conger et al. (1998) 
board effectiveness have a direct relation with the time spent on board meetings.More board 
meetings allow directors to fully perform their duties. This is consistent with agency theory which 
requires more active control and monitoring of the firm.  
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Consistent with previous agency theory, having unlimited power with one director (CEO duality) 
would ultimately paralyze the board effectiveness and board members might not be able to manage 
the company’s affairs independently and effectively (Gul & Leung, 2004).We ascertained the 
negative relationship of CEO duality and firm performance. The effect is also consistent across 
accounting measure and market based measure. Nevertheless, the stewardship theory, on the other 
hand, supports CEO duality and links it with more focused and slexible leadership which leads to 
reap a higher firm performance(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Further, we analyzed whether the presence of CEO duality effect the board independence. The 
interactive term i.e., CDBIND has negative coefficient value on TobinQ. Consistent with previous 
literature, CEO duality negatively affect board independence (Gul & Leung, 2004). Ironically our 
findings suggest, that CEO duality further strengthen negative role  of board indpendence in case 
of market based measure, which may detoriate the performance. However, the relationship is 
insignficant with accounting based measure.  
The concentrated ownership positively affects firm performance (TobinQ). Consistent with claim 
of Nguyen et al. (2014), who argued that there is a greater incentive for large shareholders to 
monitor and hold management accountable for the shareholders’ benefit which can lead to 
mitigation of agency problem and increasing firm’s profitability. Nevertheless, according to La 
Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002), these large shareholders might sometimes 
become a source of conflict between minority and majority shareholders. Such observation is 
generally in agreement with Ma, Yiu, and Zhou (2014), along with some other studies as well. Our 
practical evidences thus supports the agency view which states that concentration of the ownership 
appears to be a productive internal corporate governance strategy which contributes towards 
increasing performance(Nguyen et al., 2015).Similarly, we also established the positive linear 
managerial ownership and firm performance. The results are consistent with alignment of interest 
hypothesis which states that managerial ownership align the management interest with 
shareholders’ interest, which reduce the agency conflict and increases the firm performance and 
they have less incentive for opportunistic behavior (Huang et al., 2007).Our findings also 
ascertained the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. This 
non-linearity of relationship is consistent with Hu and Izumida (2008).Results of current study 
ascertain negative association between institutional ownership of a firm and its performance. 
Inconsistent with agency theory, which states that institutional shareholders have greater capacity 
to curtail the manager’s opportunistic behavior (Fama & Jensen, 1983a).However, according to La 
Porta et al.,(2000) ‘institutional investors may be sometimes a potential source of conflict between 
minority and majority shareholders’. Our findings related of Audit quality and committee are 
consistent with stewardship theory. As the theory states that greater control would compromise the 
stewards’ freedom to take strategic decisions, which may damage the performance. The change in 
code of corporate governance reduces (enhance) the accounting based measure firm performance 




Table 05: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Small Firms) 
      
  
 ROE  TobinQ     
  Coeff Coeff Coeff   Coeff Coeff Coeff 
     
   
L.TBQ     0.843*** 0.850*** 0.628*** 
     -0.0223 -0.024 -0.0124 
L.ROE 0.0121** 0.00823* 0.00552  
   
 0.005 0.00485 0.00478  
   
BSIZ 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.127***  0.0345** 0.0286* 0.0159 
 0.0221 0.023 0.0236  0.0146 0.0166 0.0102 
BIND -0.0293 0.0221 0.0228  0.0786** 0.240*** 0.170*** 
 0.0641 0.0705 0.0719  0.0348 0.0491 0.0658 
BMEET -0.0079 -0.00794 -0.00583  -0.0353*** -0.0347*** -0.0189*** 
 0.00624 0.00578 0.00573  0.00775 0.00777 0.00596 
CD -0.111*** -0.0939** -0.0994**  -0.131*** -0.0125 -0.0864*** 
 0.0422 0.0468 0.0456  0.0319 0.0304 0.0334 
CDBIND  -0.124 -0.127   -0.562*** -0.264*** 
  0.106 0.107   0.114 0.0763 
CONC -0.177** -0.135 -0.187*  0.0750* 0.0849** 0.116*** 
 0.0857 0.0983 0.102  0.0436 0.0423 0.0322 
INST -0.787*** -0.783*** -0.764***  -0.195* -0.119 -0.227*** 
 0.149 0.152 0.153  0.116 0.115 0.0825 
MANGSQ  0.443** 0.622*   0.365* -0.246 
  0.195 0.365   0.196 0.301 
AUQ 1.037*** 1.079*** 1.034***  0.0617 -0.0784 -0.130* 
 0.179 0.175 0.169  0.128 0.129 0.0721 
ACC -0.168*** -0.172*** -0.195***  -0.0189 -0.0783 0.0056 
 0.0523 0.0543 0.0525  0.0528 0.0596 0.0414 
MANG 0.315**  -0.0775  0.431***  0.297 
 0.129  0.226  0.153  0.193 
CCCG   -0.391***  
  
0.273*** 
   0.0445  
  
0.0602 
FSZ 0.107 0.0872 0.0988  -0.781*** -0.840*** -0.628*** 
 0.0695 0.0659 0.0697  0.0834 0.0966 0.0606 
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Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, and * at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively 
 
 
Constant 1.507 1.533 0.906  10.84*** 11.85*** 8.726*** 
 0.955 0.94 0.891  1.267 1.434 0.852 
Wald Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan Test 0.3894 0.4304 0.4138  0.2313 0.1275 0.3000 
AR2 Test( P value) 0.3044 0.2922 0.2905  0.5845 0.6383 0.4441 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 339 339 339  230 230 332 
Number of NUM 92 92 92   82 82 91 
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Table 06: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Big Firms)  
      
  
 ROE  TobinQ 
  Coeff Coeff Coeff  Coeff Coeff Coeff 
    
    
L.TBQ    
 
0.827*** 0.826*** 0.770*** 
    
 
0.0303 0.03 0.0267 
L.ROE 0.0243*** 0.0249*** 0.0251*** 
    
 0.00142 0.00149 0.00151 
    
BSIZ -4.70E-05 0.000875 -0.00209 
 
-0.0902*** -0.0930*** -0.0406*** 
 0.0154 0.0166 0.0167 
 
0.00981 0.0102 0.0117 
BIND 0.901*** 0.911*** 0.900*** 
 
-0.778*** -0.763*** -0.557*** 
 0.0943 0.127 0.127 
 
0.067 0.070 0.0707 
BMEET 0.0288*** 0.0292*** 0.0289*** 
 
0.0183* 0.0195** 0.00268 
 0.0079 0.00791 0.00788 
 
0.00979 0.00955 0.00702 
CD -0.758*** -0.745*** -0.706*** 
 
-0.118*** -0.130*** -0.155*** 
 0.14 0.161 0.164 
 
0.0334 0.0478 0.0435 
CDBIND  -0.0319 -0.115 
 
 -0.00435 0.328* 
  0.333 0.342 
 
 0.156 0.19 
CONC -0.0117 -0.0297 -0.0154 
 
0.122*** 0.120*** 0.196*** 
 0.049 0.0486 0.0488 
 
0.043 0.0435 0.0499 
INST 0.0132 -0.034 0.0253 
 
-0.332* -0.328* -0.0748 
 0.247 0.247 0.252 
 
0.172 0.172 0.162 
MANGSQ  0.106 0.895 
 
 -0.019 -0.35 
  0.264 0.55 
 
 0.107 0.31 
AUQ -0.383*** -0.397*** -0.415*** 
 
0.0522 0.0542 0.0988** 
 0.0854 0.0858 0.0899 
 
0.0471 0.046 0.0422 
ACC 0.0029 -0.00382 -0.00197 
 
0.0763 0.0646 0.074 
 0.0656 0.0657 0.0649 
 
0.0517 0.0472 0.0466 
MANG -0.0264  -0.625 
 
-0.064  0.315 
 0.181  0.386 
 
0.0936  0.266 
CCCG   -0.594*** 
   
0.415*** 
   0.145 
   
0.0968 
FSZ 0.369*** 0.314** 0.356*** 
 
0.258*** 0.243*** 0.255** 
 0.118 0.127 0.121 
 
0.0439 0.0441 0.0997 
21 
 
Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, and * at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively 
4.3 Regression Analysis for Sub Samples (Small Firms and Large Firms): 
Further, Detthamrong et al. (2017) argued in their study that behavior of corporate governance 
varies across firm’s characteristics. Among others, Ullah and Kamal (2017) also argued that 
the size of the firm should be considered by policy makers while formulating framework for 
corporate governance. Thus, in current study, we explored the corporate governance 
mechanism and firm performance in a dynamic penal setting for sub samples (Small firms & 
Large firms). We have constructed the sub sample in such a way that firm with firm size less 
than the mean value of whole is considered a small firms otherwise large firms.  
As far as small size firms are concerned, the findings depict positive coefficient of board size 
and performance (ROE &TobinQ). Consistent with notion, that diversified background of 
board members in term of expertise and resources ensure effective monitoring (Harris & Raviv, 
2010; Xie, Davidson III, & DaDalt, 2003) protect concern stakeholders interest and improve 
external linkages (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). Moreever, in case of large firms 
the findings of current study found that performance deteriorates with the increase in board 
size due to their conflict of interest and slackness in decision making. Similar, we observed 
that different sized of firms also effects the relationship of board independence and board 
meeting. For instance, in small firms, positive relationship between firm’s performance and 
board independence is consistent with notion that board independence reduces the agency 
problem thereby act as moderator between principal and agent. Subsequently, more prominent 
board freedom keep directors from increasing personal satisfaction at the expense of investors 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). The Positive (negative) coefficient values in case of large size firm 
(Small firms) are consistent with notion that firm allocate time and resource to conduct board 
meetings. Therefore, the board meeting may costly for small firms due to limited resources and 
could be beneficial for the big firms due their stable financial position.   
Similarly, the positive coefficient of interactive term (CDBIND) is consistent with agency 
theory in a sense that CEO duality further weaken the positive board independence and its 
relationship with performance in sub sample (Small firms). Consistent with notion that Gul and 
Leung (2004) argued that having unlimited power with one director (CEO duality) would 
ultimately paralyze the board effectiveness and board members probably won't most likely 
freely and successfully deal with the organization's undertaking. However, in case of large firm, 
it curtails the negative effect of board independence over the performance. Furthermore, 
concentrated ownership is disastrous in case of accounting based measure in small firms only.  
Constant 5.947*** 4.889** 5.051** 
 
4.008*** 3.726*** 5.360*** 
 2.073 2.218 1.965 
 
0.912 0.884 1.637 
Wald Test 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan Test 0.5157 0.542 0.5886 
 
0.2354 0.2499 0.0346 
AR2 Test 0.3407 0.3382 0.3336 
 
0.2425 0.2225 0.4166 
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 437 437 437 
 
323 323 433 
Number of 
NUM 
99 99 99 
  
90 90 99 
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However, we found the persistent behavior of negative effect CEO duality, positive effect of 
concentrated ownership, and negative impact of institutional possession on firm execution 
crosswise over sub samples. The results of CEO duality is consistent with notion that CEO 
duality would ultimately paralyze the board effectiveness (Hussain & Shah, 2017). While 
positive coefficient of concentrated ownership is consistent with the notion of Nguyen et al., 
(2015), which stated that concentrated ownership structures mitigate agency problems, which 
may arise because of separated control from ownership. Zeitun (2014) also ascertained the 
Positive effect of concentrated performance ownership. However, in case of accounting based 
measure for firm performance, the concentrated ownership has statistically insignificant with 
performance. Tuschke and Gerard Sanders (2003) also ascertained that ownership 
concentration has no effect on performance. Moreover, institutional ownership might 
potentially cause conflict of interests to arise among minority and dominant part investors. (La 
Porta et al., 2000). We ascertained the positive (negative) effect of change in code of corporate 
governance on return on equity (Tobin’s Q). Findings of our study concluded that change in 
governance codes deteriorate the short performance. However, it has a positive contribution in 
shaping long term performance.  
5. Conclusion 
Majority of the past studies investigated the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance through static models (Detthamrong et al., 2017). However, the relationship has 
also been investigated in dynamic penal framework (e.g. Guest, 2009; Akbar et al., 2016; 
Hussain and Shah,2017; Abdallah & Ismail, 2017) in order to curtail the potential problem in 
corporate governance-performance relationship. However, these studies have considered 
performance as function of corporate governance index. 
Our findings suggest that corporate governance mechanism varies across sub samples and also 
across different proxies for market-based firm performance and accounting. The effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance varied for large and small size firms. The interactive 
role of CEO duality also varies across sub samples. For instance, in case of small firms, the 
presence of CEO duality damages the effectiveness of board independence. However, it curtails 
the negative effect of board independence on performance in large firms. Further, we find a 
positive and non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and performance for small 
firms. Moreover, the change in code of corporate governance has negative effect on short-term 
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